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Thomas Ryan, SM

Margaret Somerville, Bird on an Ethics Wire: Battles about Values in the Culture Wars,
Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015; xviii + 358 pp.; Hardcover AUD
$37.35
The context of Margaret Somerville’s latest book is distilled in one sentence. ‘Western
secular democracies, such as Canada, are often described as involved in “culture wars,”
manifested as conflicts between the proponents of conservative values and so-called
progressive values’ (86). Within this setting, she discusses key issues or ‘battles about values’
with a particular focus on bioethics. The book’s title flags her basic position: ‘a cartoon shows
a long row of birds perched on a telephone wire between two poles. All the birds are facing
forward, except for one. The bird next to him asks, “Can’t we talk about it?” (3). Despite
disagreement with many others (even the majority), the author is still intent on a serious
engagement with them and their views.
In the first two chapters, Somerville deals with liberty rights and the values that protect
them. She explores who can or cannot participate in debates, first, in the ‘public square’ and,
second, in the academic setting of the university. The author contends that everyone has a
‘belief system’ (whether religious, secular or atheistic) that is the ‘informing principle’ of one’s
attitudes, values and behaviour. If a society is to be democratic, both religious and secular
voices ‘have a valid role in the public square on an equal footing’ (45). More specifically, she
argues that, within academia, there is the influence of a ‘velvet totalitarianism’ which, in the
name of ‘political correctness’, tries to exclude particular views, values or voices from the
conversation by suppressing certain freedoms (e.g., of religion or of thought). This is again
undemocratic but is also antipathetic to the university’s search for truth. By implication,
Somerville questions the assumption that one needs to leave aside personally held convictions
and commitments in order to be ‘neutral’ and objective and, hence, more rational. Such an
approach distorts our humanity, rationality itself and the process of moral reasoning.
Chapters 3-6 examine case-studies or situations concerning respect for life and its
protection. After surveying various disciplines on the understanding and use of the concept of
human dignity, she concludes that, since there is no common agreement on the term, it needs
careful handling (Ch. 3). This is followed by a detailed and well-sourced analysis of a landmark
case from the Canadian courts on legalizing ‘physician-assisted death’ (Ch. 4).
In Ch. 5, perhaps the hub of this book, the author addresses the question of the special
quality and beauty of human beings, how they (and human life) are worthy of respect in a way
that is different from animals. She argues that human value and respect for life are anchored
in the ‘human spirit’- an inclusive term acceptable both to those who are not religious and to
those who are religious (whatever form that takes). The human spirit is sustained in openness
to experiences of ‘amazement, wonder, and awe’ (10, 191-196), in a sense of relatedness to
‘other people, to the world, and to the universe in which we live’ (44) and in the desire to find
meaning and purpose in life.
Within this ‘secular sacred’ context, Somerville discusses the difficult question of finding
meaning in, and alleviating, suffering, especially in beginning and end-of-life issues. For
instance, on moral and legal grounds she argues against physician-assisted suicide and the use
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of enhancement technologies to create ‘super children’ (183). She acknowledges the influence
of personal witness and the counter-cultural impact of those who find meaning, love and hope
in suffering without romanticizing disability, as with Jean Vanier and L’Arche communities
(197). The challenge is how to appreciate and communicate ‘the unique and precious value of
each human life, especially the lives of people who are vulnerable’ (199). This is pursued in
Ch. 6 with the discussion of how a ‘crisis-pregnancy’ might be converted into a ‘mystery, the
gift of life.’
The final two chapters deal with how social values are established, maintained, even,
eliminated: first, how, in courts and legislatures, applied ethics in law affects societal values
especially with advances in science (Ch. 7); second, what questions and issues arise in informal
cultural contexts that can shape societal values (Ch. 8). These chapters confirm the author’s
persistent emphasis on the need for enhanced palliative care (138, 176, 262), on the societal
repercussions of individual choices and on the obligations we have to hold ‘the future in trust
for the generations to follow’ especially in the context of human life, birth and death’ (199).
There are four appendices: a personal essay on ‘the best teacher I ever had’ (the author’s
father); three statements on academic freedom; notes on the concept of human dignity as found
in four international instruments; the declaration of Montreal on the fundamental right to access
to pain management.
For Somerville, allied with the ‘human spirit’ is a sense of mystery which, if rejected or
ignored, has epistemological and moral implications. It entails a correlation with a limited view
of rationality, namely, that ‘logical, cognitive, rational mentation is the only valid way of
human knowing.’ This can lead to a ‘rejection of other ways of knowing such as intuition,
especially moral intuition, examined emotions, experiential knowledge, and so on’ (40). Such
considerations are relevant if one’s understanding of the human person is to be adequate to
underpinning discussions of such legal/ethical import and of moral reasoning itself. Further,
these corrections to a limited rationality, if developed further, could help counter the author's
concern that accusations of affective experiences such as ‘amazement, wonder, and awe’ as
being too ‘ephemeral and “flakey”’ (x).
By way of suggestion, perhaps this could be done first, by drawing on the philosophical
insights into the relational nature of human person, for instance, as found in philosopher John
Macmurray. Second, one could tap into the extensive work done in virtue ethics specifically
on how our emotions and embodied forms of knowing are integral to ethical awareness and
moral reasoning. In this way, our relation to reality goes beyond ‘perception’ (5-6) so that the
cognitive is integrally related to the affective, namely, those dispositions to being moved and
responding to what is truly good. There is some convergence here with moral philosopher
Raimond Gaita who draws attention to the role of witness that is embodied and realised in action
in disclosing certain moral values (exemplified in L’Arche, as noted above).
Third, behind Somerville’s discussions one senses the presence of the Aristotelian
understanding of practical reason as not so much speculative but appreciative knowledge of
the good (value). Again, in moral matters we cannot have absolute but only moral certitude in
specific situations, given the variables involved. While the ‘old’ virtue of prudence may, at
times, involve ‘ethical restraint’ for the author (xiv), it is principally characterized by sensitivity
to the unique features of people and situations and flexibility in evaluating them. Prudence
often entails an element of risk and can involve wise judgment, not about the prefect choice,
but about the best that is possible in the circumstances.
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A final observation. The author’s extensive discussion highlights how respect for human
life as a fundamental value must be underpinned (especially with divided views on human
dignity) by a solidly established case for the moral status of the human person as an absolute
value (Kant’s treating persons as ends in themselves). It is only on this foundation and its
associated moral claims that one can incorporate instances of human impairment (intellectual
and physical), of diminished autonomy or consciousness and the reality of suffering. In so
doing, perhaps we can get only so far with the ‘secular sacred’, with philosophical argument
or phenomenological analysis of human subjectivity with its capacity for wonder and awe and
the drive to be part of something bigger than oneself. In the light of Somerville’s extensive
and insightful discussion, one wonders whether, in the final analysis, the human person as an
absolute centre of value can only be firmly established through a transcendent and ultimate
source from outside human experience, as in a personal deity, namely, within the ‘religious
sacred’? Further, in the face of suffering, while personal witness can offer a powerful argument
(as noted above), will it always be the case that the Christian message, centred on the crucified
and risen Jesus, is both a stumbling block and foolishness for Athens?
This is a very important book for its thorough and critically alert discussion of beginning
and end-of-life issues. While centred on representative case-studies or court judgments,
principally from the Canadian context, the author skilfully enables its scope to be
comprehensive in its treatment of principles and legal/ethical considerations from a range of
disciplines. Again, this is an enlightening and valuable study which is, at the same time,
disturbing. The issues and concerns she addresses are not limited to Canada but are current
and pressing—certainly within common-law jurisdictions (such as Australia) and beyond.
This book is timely and very professional—in the quality and scope of its research,
analysis and references, in its detailed index and, importantly, in the clarity of the writing. We
are indebted to Margaret Somerville for her depth of scholarship, her generosity of spirit and,
to modify the controlling metaphor of the title, her persistence and courage in going against the
tide.
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